notes the mismatch between this knowledge and the route choice assumptions embedded in the most widely used assignment models. Empirical evidence on the influence of route guidance advice on route choice is reviewed and, despite its limited nature, is seen to suggest that users are reluctant to follow advice unless they find it convincing and that, the more familiar they are with the network, the less likely they are to accept advice. Typically only a small minority of journeys are made in total compliance with advice.
notes the mismatch between this knowledge and the route choice assumptions embedded in the most widely used assignment models. Empirical evidence on the influence of route guidance advice on route choice is reviewed and, despite its limited nature, is seen to suggest that users are reluctant to follow advice unless they find it convincing and that, the more familiar they are with the network, the less likely they are to accept advice. Typically only a small minority of journeys are made in total compliance with advice.
Results from an interactive route choice simulator (IGOR) are summarised and are seen to reveal that compliance depends on the extent to which the advice is corroborated by other factors, on the drivers' familiarity with the network and on the quality of advice previously received. It is noted that the IGOR results are in a form which would enable response models to be calibrated.
Recent approaches to the modelling of route choice in the context of guidance are discussed. Some are seen to make simplifying assumptions which must limit the relevance of their results; most make no allowance for the fact that drivers are unlikely to comply with all advice and several are not able to represent the benefits which guidance might bring in the context of sporadic congestion or incidents.
As an alternative, a two phase model comprising a medium term strategic equilibrium and a day-specific simulation with explicit representation of driver response is proposed,
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the impact of in-vehicle route guidance and information (IVRGI) systems on route choice. IVRGI systems include directional aids (eg. Toyota's NAVICOM), current-position displays (eg. ETAK's NAVIGATOR or Nissan's DRIVEGUIDE), real time traffic information transmissions (eg. via car radios using the HAR, ARI or ADS systems), real time congestion displays (eg. General Logistics' TRAFFICMASTER), guidance based on historic data (eg. Mercedes Benz' Routen-Rechner) and guidance based on real time data (eg. Siemens' ALISCOUT). Each of these have the ability to influence drivers' choices of routes and each might affect these choices in different ways.
There is currently considerable government interest in the development of IVRGI systems as witnessed by the promotion of programmes such as DRIVE in Europe and RACS/AMTICS in Japan and by the recent Report to Congress in the USA. This interest is partly a reflection of industrial-commercial strategy by the respective governments but also reflects a belief that such systems might assist in the solution of traffic problems (see Jeffery 1981; OECD 1988) .
It is suggested that IVRGI systems can produce benefits to the traffic system in four ways:
-Firstly and most fundamentally, by improving people's knowledge of the network and by assisting them to find efficient routes, some of the resources currently wasted in unnecessary time or mileage can be recovered (see for example Jeffery et al. 1987) . Estimates of the magnitude of such "wastage" range from 2% to 12% of current total miles and minutes (see Wootton et al. 1981 ).
Secondly, it is thought that by reducing unnecessary mileage, traffic volumes, and hence congestion, can be reduced.
Thirdly, it is thought that by linking IVRGI with traffic control (see CARGOES 1989) and, perhaps, road pricing systems (see Brett & Estlea 1989) all three systems could become more effective.
Fourthly, it is suggested that, by manipulating the information or guidance provided to drivers it might be possible to discourage them from using routes which are environmentally sensitive and that it might be possible to bring about routing patterns that are more globally efficient (the so called "system optimum").
The last of these is the subject of most debate; detractors argue that drivers are unlikely to accept advice which is not in their own, selfish, best interest and that unless system-optimal guidance is backed up by differential road pricing they will tend to ignore it. Even in the absence of deliberate attempts by network managers to promote system-optimal or environmentally sound routing, users may sometimes believe that the advised route is not best for them and, of course, they may be right; either because of "gaps" in the guidance system's knowledge of the network or of up-to-the-minute traffic conditions or because the system and the user have different routing criteria. Recent work by JMP (1989) has suggested that London drivers whose normal route includes secondary roads would suffer journey time increases of around 15% if they followed advice from a system that knew only about main roads.
